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Abstract 
 
The “ZIP” adaptive automated trading algorithm has been demonstrated to outperform human 
traders in experimental studies of continuous double auction (CDA) markets populated by mix-
tures of human and “software robot” traders. Previous papers have shown that values of the eight 
parameters governing behavior of ZIP traders can be automatically optimized using a genetic al-
gorithm (GA), and that markets populated by GA-optimized traders perform better than those 
populated by ZIP traders with manually-set parameter values. This paper introduces a more so-
phisticated version of the ZIP algorithm, called “ZIP60”, which requires the values of 60 pa-
rameters to be set correctly. ZIP60 is shown here to produce significantly better results in com-
parison to the original ZIP algorithm (called “ZIP8” hereafter) when a GA is used to search the 
60-dimensional parameter space. It is also demonstrated here that this works best when the GA 
itself has control over the dimensionality of the search-space, allowing evolution to guide the ex-
pansion of the search-space up from 8 parameters to 60 via intermediate steps. Principal compo-
nent analysis of the best evolved ZIP60 parameter-sets establishes that no ZIP8 solutions are em-
bedded in the 60-dimensional space. Moreover, some of the results and analysis presented here 
cast doubt on previously-published ZIP8 results concerning the evolution of new ‘hybrid’ auction 
mechanisms that appeared to be improvements on the CDA: it now seems likely that those results 
were actually consequences of the relative lack of sophistication in the original ZIP8 algorithm, 
because “hybrid” mechanisms occur much less frequently when ZIP60s are used.   
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1. Introduction and Background 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
The Zero-Intelligence Plus (“ZIP”) adaptive automated trading algorithm (Cliff, 1997) 
has been demonstrated to outperform human traders in experimental studies of continu-
ous double auction (CDA) markets populated by mixtures of human and “robot” traders 
(Das, et al., 2001). The CDA is an auction mechanism in which transaction prices ob-
served in the marketplace reliably, rapidly, and robustly converge to the market’s under-
lying theoretical competitive equilibrium price. Such equilibration behavior is highly de-
sirable, and the CDA is used extensively in the world’s financial markets. To successfully 
populate a CDA market with ZIP traders, the values of eight control parameters need to 
be set correctly. While these eight values can of course be set manually, previous papers 
have demonstrated that values of those parameters can be automatically optimized using 
a simple genetic algorithm (GA) to tailor ZIP traders to particular markets, producing re-
sults superior to those from ZIP traders with manually-set parameter values (Cliff, 1998, 
2001). Furthermore, a simple extension of the GA-ZIP approach (i.e., adding a single ad-
ditional real-valued numeric parameter) allows for mechanized market-mechanism de-
sign, and has been demonstrated as a possible way of automatically discovering novel 
forms of auction mechanism that appear to have better equilibration properties than the 
CDA (Cliff, 2002a-d, 2003). This paper introduces a more sophisticated version of the 
ZIP algorithm, which is known as “ZIP60”, because it requires 60 real-valued control pa-
rameters to be set correctly, and thus the original ZIP algorithm is now in turn re-named 
“ZIP8”. It is shown here that CDA markets populated with ZIP60 traders have signifi-
cantly better equilibration behavior than markets populated with ZIP8 traders.  
 
Manually identifying the correct values for 60 control parameters could be a very labori-
ous task, but it is demonstrated here that an appropriate automatic optimization process 
can discover good sets of values for the parameters. The same simple GA as was used 
with ZIP8s, now operating in the 60-dimensional parameter space, produces ZIP60 trad-
ers with mean scores significantly improved over ZIP8s, but also with worryingly high 
variance in those improvements. A slight revision of the approach is shown to give re-
sults with even higher mean improvements and also with much lower variance in those 
improvements. The revised approach involves giving the GA control over the dimension-
ality of the parameter-space being searched so that the evolutionary search starts in an 
eight-dimensional space, and the GA then automatically and gradually expands the di-
mensionality of the search-space up to sixty-dimensional only when the increased num-
ber of parameters leads to identifiably better solutions. 
 
Reliance on an offline (“batch-mode”) optimizer such as the GA used here is something 
of an obstacle to real-world deployment of ZIP60. If we consider any one vector of 60 
parameter values as a candidate “solution” for using ZIP60 in a real-world market or 
marketplace, then the GA can be thought of as evaluating a large number of candidate 
solutions against some number of test problems, with the intention that the best solution 
found by the GA could then be deployed in the real-world market.  The problem with this 
approach is that the best solution will be well-tailored to the set of test-problems, and so 
if there is any mismatch between the test problems and the real market (or if the real D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           3 
market changes in some significant way while the GA optimizer is running) then the 
“best” solution found by the GA may perform poorly in the real market. Thus, the ulti-
mate intention of this work is to develop “online” learning/adaptation techniques that can 
react to market conditions and events to adjust the ZIP60 parameters “on the fly”, in real 
time. But, before that is done, the GA is used here to establish initial proof of the concept 
that there exist ZIP60 solutions that perform better than ZIP8s. Having established that 
existence proof in Section 3 of this paper, Section 4 goes on to analyze the evolved ZIP60 
solutions, first to demonstrate that they do not involve ZIP8 solutions embedded in the 
60-d space; and second in an attempt to identify any redundant dimensions in the ZIP60 
parameter space that could be eliminated without significant change to the behavior of 
the ZIP60 traders. This search for redundancy is important because many online/real-time 
learning algorithms scale poorly as the number of dimensions increase. So, for instance, 
if it can be demonstrated that there is some set of 27 (say) basis vectors that define a sub-
space within the 60-d ZIP60 parameter space that eliminates all redundancy from the pa-
rameter set, then that is likely to make the successful application of an online learning 
method significantly more practicable 
 
Furthermore, the results from ZIP60 presented in this paper, while better than ZIP8, show 
a markedly reduced incidence of cases where the GA discovers novel “hybrid” auction 
mechanisms, in which the ZIP traders perform significantly better than when they interact 
within the fixed CDA mechanism. A plausible interpretation of this is that it indicates 
that the earlier ZIP8 results (where improvements on the CDA were common) were 
actually consequences of the relative lack of sophistication in the ZIP8 algorithm, rather 
than consequences of previously-undiscovered weaknesses in the CDA mechanism that 
the ZIP8 traders were operating within. 
 
So, in summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:  
 
•  The ZIP60 algorithm, and a number of other higher-dimensioned-parameter-space 
extensions of the original ZIP8, are introduced. 
 
•  It is shown that difficulties encountered in searching a 60-dimensional space ab initio 
can be circumvented by commencing the search in a lower-dimensional space and 
then allowing the GA to automatically and gradually increase the dimensionality of 
the search space. 
 
•  Experimental results from t he performance of GA-optimized ZIP60 traders are 
summarized and analyzed. These new results come from extensive simulation studies 
involving over 97 billion trading periods (simulated “days” in the experimental mar-
kets), and they empirically demonstrate the superiority of ZIP60 over ZIP8. 
   
•  The underlying GA-optimized parameter values are visualized and analyzed using 
multivariate statistics techniques, to explore whether any of the 60 parameters are un-
used or redundant. In all cases, the best solution involved more than 8 parameter val-
ues. Nevertheless, evidence is presented here that in some cases many fewer than 60 
unique parameter-value need to be specified when using ZIP60, because the best val-
ues for some parameters may be dependent on (or derivable from) the values of one 
or more other parameters. For instance, the value of one parameter might be directly D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           4 
computable from a simple linear combination of the values of the other parameters, or 
perhaps as a nonlinear function of some other subset of parameters. This paper pre-
sents a proof-of-concept in analyzing the best 60-dimensional parameter-vectors 
found by the GA, identifying lower-dimensional subspaces in which the best solu-
tions reside.
2       
 
•  The results presented here cast some doubt on previously-published results, where a 
parameter governing the auction-market mechanism was also evolved (strictly, co-
evolved) alongside the eight parameters governing the ZIP8 traders (Cliff 2002a-d, 
2003). In those earlier results, it appeared that the GA was discovering new “hybrid” 
auction mechanisms that have better equilibration behavior than the CDA. The results 
presented here indicate that perhaps the earlier results are artifacts of populating the 
markets with ZIP8 traders: when ZIP60 traders are used in the same style of experi-
ment, the evolved auction mechanisms differ from the CDA much less frequently. 
 
In the interests of scientific openness and ease of replicability, the C source-code that was 
used to generate the results in this paper has been published as a technical report freely 
available on the web (Cliff, 2005). 
 
This paper concludes at the point where the superiority of ZIP60 over ZIP8 has been 
demonstrated by using a GA optimizer to find appropriate settings of the sixty parameter-
values. There are several open avenues of research that could be pursued to extend or 
further explore the ideas presented here. In particular, it is important to note that the 
results in this paper  are certainly not intended as  an absolute and  conclusive 
demonstration that ZIP60 is superior to all other CDA bidding algorithms, or that the 
solutions discovered by the GA are optimal in the sense of the GA routinely discovering 
Nash equilibria in the experimental markets that ZIP60 is studied within here.  
Identification and analysis of  Nash equilibria in the evolved solutions would require 
extensive additional empirical work, and anyhow the manifest limitations of the ZIP60 
agents (in comparison to idealized omnipotent agents) mean that such equilibria may 
simply not be attainable: see, for example, (Gottlob, Greco, & Scarcello, 2005; Bowling 
& Veloso, 2004).  
 
Moreover, this paper  studies  the  equilibrating  performance of  markets  that are 
homogeneously populated with one type of trader-agent, in the style of (Gode & Sunder, 
1993; Cliff, 1997; Preist & van Tol, 1998; and Gjerstad & Dickhaut, 1998), rather than 
studying strategic interactions within markets heterogeneously populated by two or more 
different types of trading algorithms or market mechanisms, such as is exemplified by the 
work of ( Tesauro & Das, 2001; Tesauro &  Bredin, 2002;  and  Phelps, Parsons, & 
McBurney, 2004). The rationale for this paper’s focus on studying interactions among 
populations of homogeneous traders  exposed to dynamically changing supply  and 
demand is straightforward.  While the original paper (Cliff, 1997)  that introduced the 
ZIP8 algorithm studied its performance only in homogeneously populated markets, ZIP8 
was subsequently used as a benchmark trading algorithm in numerous studies of strategic 
interactions between heterogeneous mixes of trading algorithms, performed by several 
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independent groups of researchers. The number of such papers in which ZIP8 (or close 
derivatives of ZIP8)  have been used  is fairly  substantial,  and the list includes the 
following: (Das, Hanson, Kephart, & Tesauro, 2001; Tesauro & Das, 2001; Tesauro & 
Bredin, 2002;  He,  Leung, &  Jennings,  2003;  Phelps, Parsons, & McBurney, 2004; 
Vytelingum, Dash, David, & Jennings, 2004; and Bagnall & Toft, 2004). Thus, given that 
so much prior work exploring strategic interactions and heterogeneous populations has 
been based on ZIP8, it seems reasonable at least to presume that researchers with an 
interest in studying heterogeneous marketplaces might find ZIP60 a useful new 
benchmark,  even though this current paper reports only on ZIP60 in homogeneous 
settings. The study of ZIP60’s strategic interactions with other CDA bidding algorithms 
is certainly an important topic of further research, but it is not within the scope of this 
paper; this paper first seeks to establish that ZIP60 is a worthwhile replacement for ZIP8. 
 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that in pretty much all of the above-cited papers studying 
strategic interactions between heterogeneous mixtures of bidding algorithms, the results 
come from experiments in which the nature of the market supply and demand curves are 
essentially fixed for the duration of each experiment. That is, with the notable exception 
of the paper by Das et al., (2001), none of these studies explore the effects that sudden 
significant alterations to the supply or demand (or both) curves can have on the trader-
agent performance and/or on market’s internal dynamics: the supply and demand curves 
for the initial trading period in any one experiment are largely the same as the curves for 
the final trading period in that experiment. This seems very curious, considering that one 
commonly-claimed motivation for studying market systems is that mechanisms such as 
the CDA are interesting because of their ability to quickly and robustly adapt to dynamic 
and unexpected changes in supply and/or demand; and considering that studies of shock-
changes in human CDA markets date back at least as far as Vernon Smith’s seminal 1962 
paper (Smith, 1962); and considering that such changes are widely known to occur in 
real-world markets.
3  This raises a significant question: if CDA markets are interesting 
because they exhibit attractive adaptation to dynamic  changes in supply and demand, 
why is there this devotion in the published trading-agent literature to studying systems 
with essentially static supply and demand curves? In contrast, the results reported in this 
paper all come from experiments in which the marketplaces populated by ZIP60 traders 
periodically undergo sudden “shock” changes to the supply and/or demand curves, and 
where the ZIP60 traders are optimized on the basis of their ability to rapidly and stably 
adapt not only to the initial supply and demand schedule, but also to the new market 
supply and demand  conditions  prevailing  after each shock-change.
4  So, in the 
experiments reported here, the final supply and demand curves in any one experiment 
may be significantly different from the initial ones.  It seems reasonable to question 
whether the patterns of strategic interactions reported by the other authors cited above 
might possibly be different if they had used dynamically-changing rather than static 
supply and demand curves. For example: if strategy S1 dominates strategy S2 under static 
conditions, it may nevertheless be plausible that S2 adapts better than S1 in times of 
sudden significant change to supply  and/or demand, so that if the two strategies are 
                                                            
3 E.g., in high-frequency foreign-exchange price time series, “gap” step-changes in price are not unusual.  
4 The successful adaptive response of ZIP8 traders to shock-changes in the market’s supply and demand 
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compared in a market with sufficiently turbulent supply and demand, S2 could be found 
to dominate S1. Exploring this issue is another important topic for further research. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 gives some introductory and 
background material, which is necessarily very similar to previously-published accounts 
of the history and rationale for this work. Section 2 then gives an overview of ZIP traders 
and of the experimental methods used, including a description of the continuously-vari-
able space of auction types. This description is largely identical to the account given in 
previous papers (e.g., Cliff 2002a; 2003), albeit extended to describe how the new ex-
periments whose results are presented here differ from the previous work. Details of the 
extension to ZIP60, and results from experiments with ZIP60 traders, are presented in 
Section 3. The ZIP60 results are then analyzed and discussed in Section 4. 
 
1.2. Background 
 
Almost all traders in the global international financial markets interact via a particular 
form of auction market mechanism known as the  continuous double auction (CDA), 
more details of which will be given later.
5  The CDA has been the subject of much study 
by economists, partially because it is so common (and hence so important) in the world of 
finance, but also because CDA markets typically exhibit a very attractive characteristic: 
experimental studies have demonstrated that the transaction prices in a CDA market 
rapidly converge on the market’s theoretical  equilibrium price. Students of 
microeconomics know the equilibrium price as the price at which the market’s supply 
and demand curves intersect; but, colloquially, the equilibrium price is important because 
if transactions are consistently taking place at off-equilibrium prices then someone 
somewhere in the market is being ripped off. Hence, rapid and stable equilibration is 
desirable in any auction. The precise reasons why CDA markets typically exhibit rapid 
and stable equilibration are still the topic of research and debate (see e.g. Friedman & 
Rust, 1993).  
   
With the advent of e-commerce, various forms of auction mechanism have become very 
popular for online trading, and web-based auction sites such as eBay (www.ebay.com) 
have proven highly successful. As auctions dematerialize, moving online and becoming 
virtual “e-marketplaces”, it becomes perfectly plausible for software-agent “robot” trad-
ers to participate in those auctions. In comparison to human traders, such robots have the 
advantage of being very fast and very cheap, and in principle they can assimilate and 
rapidly act on volumes of data that would swamp even the most able of human traders.    
 
In the past three or four years, a leading-edge issue in the technical community who work 
within the world’s financial markets has been the topic of Algorithmic Trading, where 
jobs performed traditionally by human traders are increasingly automated and executed 
by algorithms. More and more, algorithmic trading systems are becoming capable of go-
ing beyond mere replication of the roles of human traders, and they are now routinely ca-
pable of executing buy or sell orders in ways that are pretty-much impossible for a human 
trader, because the human is limited by being built from slow and noisy biological mate-
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rials. For example, a single big block trade (the sheer size of which might adversely af-
fect the market price for the asset being traded) might be automatically broken up by the 
algorithmic trading system into a very large number of very small trades, which are then 
spread out over some time period to take advantage of trading opportunities as they oc-
cur, where each small trade is executed only a few microseconds after that trading op-
portunity opens up. The potential for ZIP traders to be used in algorithmic trading has 
caught the attention of journalists writing in the scientific press (Graham-Rowe, 2005), 
and in the financial press (Pritchard, 2005; Economist, 2005). 
 
For the purposes of this paper, the world financial markets can be considered as just an-
other set of instances of online e-marketplaces. This is obviously true for those central-
ized financial marketplaces (such as many major equity exchanges like the London Stock 
Exchange, or NASDAQ; and to a lesser extent the New York Stock Exchange) where 
there is a high degree of automation and machine processing of data.  For those other 
major international financial systems where trading currently takes place in the absence 
of central exchanges (such as the $1900bn/day international foreign-exchange markets, 
where decentralized networks of broker-to-broker interactions still constitute much of the 
market), increasing penetration of appropriate automation technologies is clearly occur-
ring, and so it is only a matter of time until they too are, in effect, online e-marketplaces.     
 
ZIP (Zero-Intelligence-Plus) artificial trading agents, introduced in (Cliff, 1997), are 
software-agent “trader robots” that use a few heuristic rules and some simple machine 
learning techniques to adapt to operating as buyers or sellers in electronic versions of 
open-outcry auction-market environments. The market environments are similar to those 
used in Smith’s (1962) pioneering (and subsequently Nobel-prize-winning) experimental 
economics studies of the CDA and other auction mechanisms. ZIP traders were initially 
developed as a solution to the pathological failures of Gode & Sunder’s (1993) “ZI” 
(Zero-Intelligence) traders. The original motivation for inventing ZIP was to develop 
adaptive trading agents that could be used in distributed and decentralized market-based 
control systems (e.g., Clearwater, 1995), and also to extend the scope of research in 
adaptive behavior to include the study of interactions among economic agents within 
market mechanisms (Cliff & Bruten, 1999).  However, a couple of years later, in some 
surprising empirical studies undertaken at IBM’s research labs by Das et al. (2001), it 
was shown that ZIP traders (and also IBM’s own “MGD” trading algorithm) consistently 
out-perform human traders in human-against-robot experimental-economics CDA mar-
ketplaces.  In the IBM experiments, the robot traders consistently made profits a few per-
centage points higher than did the human traders they were competing against, and ZIP 
had the joint-highest average efficiency
6 of the algorithms used in the IBM study. In dis-
cussing the possible impact of their work, Das et al. (2001) wrote that the “…successful 
demonstration of machine superiority in the CDA … could have a … powerful financial 
                                                            
6 Mean values calculated from the efficiency data presented in Table 1 of (Das et al. 2001) are 1.030 for 
ZIP (mean from n=2 experiments); 1.023 for MGD (n=4); and 0.876 for humans (n=6).  Higher efficiency 
values are more desirable. The difference between the mean values for ZIP and MGD is so small that it 
seems highly unlikely to be statistically significant.  Efficiency is defined as follows. For each trader i, let si 
denote the trader’s actual surplus, defined as the absolute difference between the transaction price and that 
trader’s limit price for the transaction. Let si* denote the trader’s theoretical surplus that would result if the 
transaction had taken place at the market’s theoretical competitive equilibrium price P0.. Efficiency is the 
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impact – one that might be measured in billions of dollars annually”, and in their conclu-
sions they speculate on the future possibility of online e-marketplaces currently populated 
by human traders becoming populated entirely by trader agents. 
 
The fact that ZIP did no worse than MGD in the heterogeneous human-robot studies re-
ported by Das et al. (2001) is curious, and something of an anomaly. Previous studies by 
the IBM team had demonstrated that in similar studies where all the traders were robots, 
MGD did better than ZIP (Tesauro & Das, 2001); and in a paper published after the Das 
et al. (2001) human-robot interaction studies, Tesauro & Bredin (2002) presented details 
of an algorithm called GDX which outperforms both MGD and ZIP in robot-vs-robot 
studies. GDX is based on MGD, extended to incorporate techniques from Dynamic Pro-
gramming. Thus, while MGD and GDX have both been shown to outperform ZIP when 
there are no human traders active in the market (with GDX being dominant), the only 
presently available rigorous experimental  results from human-robot interactions show 
ZIP and MGD as performing  equally well, and  both outperforming humans. Under-
standing why this intransitivity exists is clearly a topic for further research. 
 
The style of auction used in the experiments reported here follows that of the original ZIP 
studies (Cliff, 1997) which themselves followed Smith’s (1962) lead in having the traders 
react only to the most recent quote in the marketplace. That is, the studies here maintain 
no persistent order book showing the price-ordered list of best offers, and the price-or-
dered list of best bids, currently being quoted by the traders active in the market. In this 
sense, the experimental markets studied here are closer to the real-world markets for for-
eign exchange (FX) than they are for equities: most prominent national/international eq-
uity exchanges operate on an order-book basis; whereas the international FX markets do 
not yet do so, even where screen-based transactions account for much of the trading vol-
umes (however, a transition to showing order books or “price ladders” on FX dealing 
screens currently appears to be finally getting underway). Adapting ZIP to operate in or-
der-book-based markets is relatively trivial.  Das  et al. (2001),  and Tesauro & Das 
(2001), each used  ZIP in dynamic asynchronous  order-book-based marketplaces, and 
they report that for their studies of strategic interactions they independently arrived at the 
same relatively minor extensions of ZIP that had earlier been developed by Preist & van 
Tol (1998). Certainly the extensions required of ZIP were sufficiently minor that the au-
thors of the IBM papers did not see a need to re-name ZIP, whereas their altered and ex-
tended versions of the original GD algorithm (Gjerstad & Dickhaut, 1998) were re-named 
MGD (Tesauro & Das, 2001; Das et al., 2001) and then GDX (Tesauro & Bredin, 2002).  
   
The operation of ZIP traders has been successfully demonstrated in experimental versions 
of CDA markets similar to those found in the international financial markets, and in 
posted-offer auction markets similar to those seen in domestic high-street retail outlets 
(Cliff, 1997); and ZIP has also recently been adapted for use in sealed-bid auctions (Bag-
nall & Toft, 2004; 2005). There are a number of numeric parameters that govern the ad-
aptation and trading processes of ZIP traders, and these parameters need somehow to be 
assigned values if a marketplace is to be populated by ZIP traders. In the original 1997 
version of the ZIP algorithm, the parameter-values were set by hand, using “educated 
guesses”.  However, subsequent papers (Cliff, 1998, 2001) presented the first results from 
using a standard evolutionary computation technique – i.e., a simple “plain vanilla” ge-D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           9 
netic algorithm (GA) – to automatically optimize these parameter values, thereby elimi-
nating the need for skilled human input in deciding the values. The GA found parameter-
settings that were clear improvements on those chosen by hand by the inventor of the al-
gorithm. All experience thus far with ZIP-trader markets has indicated that the market 
dynamics are not significantly affected as the size of the market (i.e., the number of trad-
ers active in the market) increases. 
  
The present paper continues the  exploration (documented in Cliff, 2002a-d, 2003) of 
some specific consequences of asking the following question: if, as Das et al. (2001) 
speculate, trader agents will come to replace human traders at the point of execution in 
online e-marketplaces, then why should those online e-marketplaces use auction mecha-
nisms designed by humans, for humans? Perhaps there are new market mechanisms, suit-
able only to populations of robot-traders, that are more efficient (or otherwise more at-
tractive) than currently-known human-based mechanisms.  
 
Designing new market mechanisms is hard, and the space of possible mechanisms is vast. 
For this reason it is attractive to use an automated search of the space of possible mecha-
nisms: in essence, we ask a computer to do the auction-design for us. This paper contin-
ues exploring the application of one type of automated search/optimization algorithm, 
namely the GA (Goldberg, 1989; Mitchell, 1998), but any of many other types of auto-
mated search or optimization process could have been used instead of the simple GA 
used here (further details of which are given in Appendix C).  
 
Prior to the research described in (Cliff, 2002a), in all previous work using artificial 
trading agents – ZIP or otherwise – the market mechanism (i.e., the type of auction the 
agents are interacting within) had been fixed in advance. Well-known market mecha-
nisms from human economic affairs include: the English Auction (where sellers stay si-
lent and buyers quote increasing bid-prices); the Dutch Flower Auction (where buyers 
stay silent and sellers quote decreasing offer-prices); the Vickery or second-price sealed-
bid auction (where sealed bids are submitted by buyers, and the highest bidder is allowed 
to buy, but at the price of the  second-highest bid); and the CDA (where sellers can 
announce decreasing offer prices while simultaneously and asynchronously the buyers 
can announce increasing bid prices, with the sellers being free to accept any buyer’s bid 
at any time and the buyers being free to accept any seller’s offer at any time, all in the 
absence of an auctioneer). The first results from experiments where a GA optimizes not 
only the parameter values for the  ZIP trading agents, but also the style of market 
mechanism in which those traders operate, were presented in (Cliff, 2002a). To do this, a 
space of possible market mechanisms was created for evolutionary exploration. The 
space includes the CDA and also one-sided auctions similar (but not actually identical to) 
the English Auction (EA) and the Dutch Flower Auction (DFA),  Significantly, this space 
is continuously variable, allowing for any of an infinite number of peculiar hybrids of 
these auction types to be evolved, which have no known correlate in naturally occurring 
(i.e., human-designed) market mechanisms. While there was nothing to prevent the GA 
from settling on solutions that correspond to the known CDA mechanism type or the two 
entirely one-sided mechanisms, it was found that “hybrid” mechanisms, partway between 
the CDA and  the one-sided mechanisms, could lead to the most d esirable market 
dynamics. The significance of this is that although the hybrid market mechanisms could D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           10 
easily be implemented in online electronic marketplaces, they have not been designed by 
humans: rather they are the product of an automated search through a continuous space of 
possible auction-types. Thus, the results in (Cliff, 2002a) were the first demonstration 
that radically new market mechanisms for artificial traders may be designed by automatic 
means. At much the same time, Steve Phelps and his colleagues were independently 
working on a conceptually very similar (but algorithmically rather different) theme of 
using artificial evolution to develop and study new auction-market mechanisms (Phelps 
et al. 2002; Phelps, Parsons, & McBurney, 2004; Phelps et al. 2005). Specifically, the 
methods used by Phelps et al. were initially genetic programming (see e.g. Koza, 1992; 
Koza et al., 1998) and latterly replicator dynamics studies (see e.g. Taylor & Jonker, 
1978; Witt, 1992; Borgers & Sarin, 1997)  
 
Although the performance of the evolved market mechanisms is typically only better by a 
few percentage points (or even only a few basis points – i.e. a few hundredths of a per-
centage point) than that of the established human-designed mechanisms, the economic 
consequences could nevertheless be highly significant. According to figures released by 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the total value of trades on the CDA-based 
NYSE for the year 2000 was $11060bn (i.e., a little over 11 trillion dollars: see (NYSE, 
2002)). If only 0.1% of that liquidity could be eliminated or captured by a more efficient 
computer-designed market mechanism, the value saved (or profit generated) would still 
be in excess of $10bn.  And that is just for one market: similar savings could presumably 
be made at NASDAQ, at European exchanges such as those operated by LSE, Euronext, 
and Deutsche Börse, and at similar exchanges elsewhere around the globe. And they’re 
just the equity exchanges: the decentralized, global, 24x7, foreign exchange (FX) market 
is (at approximately $1900bn/day) a much more liquid market that offers proportionately 
higher potential gains.  
 
While the results presented here turn out to cast some doubt on the earlier results from 
evolving hybrid market mechanisms with ZIP traders, it is important to note that those 
doubts are not actually a conclusive demolition. Moreover, the improved versions of ZIP 
introduced in this paper are perfectly capable of operating in regular CDA auctions. 
 
The text that follows in Section 2 presents a summary of the methods used in the past 
work on GA-optimization of ZIP traders and of the market mechanisms that they operate 
within (Sections 2.1 and 2.2); it then summarises the previous results (Section 2.3); dis-
cusses related work by other researchers (Section 2.4); and ends with a critique and new 
analysis of the old results (Section 2.5).   
 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Eight-parameter Zero-Intelligence-Plus (ZIP8) Traders 
 
The original eight-parameter ZIP trading agents were described fully in a lengthy report 
(Cliff, 1997), which included sample source-code in the C programming language. For 
the purposes of the current discussion a high-level description of the algorithm and its 
eight key p arameters is sufficient, although additional details for the algorithmically 
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extension has been published in (Cliff, 2005). As will be seen in Section 3, there are in 
fact a family of ZIP algorithms between ZIP8 and ZIP60, and so hereinafter the acronym 
“ZIP” with no numeric suffix is intended to mean “all ZIPn for 8=n=60, and beyond”. 
  
ZIP traders deal in arbitrary abstract commodities. Each ZIP trader i is given a private 
(i.e., secret) limit-price, li, which for a seller is the price below which it must not sell and 
for a buyer is the price above which it must not buy. If a ZIP trader completes a transac-
tion at its li price then it generates zero utility (“profit” for the sellers or “saving” for the 
buyers), but utility greater than zero is preferred. For this reason, each ZIP trader  i 
maintains a time-varying utility margin mi(t) and generates quote-prices pi(t) at time t 
according to pi(t)=li(1+mi(t)) for sellers and pi(t)=li(1-mi(t)) for buyers. The “aim” of 
traders is to maximize their utility over all trades, where utility is the difference between 
the accepted quote-price and the trader’s li value. Trader i is given an initial value mi(0) 
(i.e., mi(t)  for t=0) which is subsequently adapted over time using a simple machine 
learning technique known as  the Widrow-Hoff rule which is also used in back-
propagation neural networks ( Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986)  and in learning 
classifier systems (Wilson, 1995). This rule has a “learning rate” parameter  bi that 
governs the speed of convergence between trader i’s quoted price pi(t) and the trader’s 
idealized “target” price ti(t). When calculating ti(t), ZIP traders introduce a small random 
absolute perturbation  with magnitude  generated from
7  U[0,ca]  (this perturbation is 
positive when increasing  ti(t), negative when decreasing) and also a small random 
relative perturbation generated from  U[1-cr,1] (when decreasing  ti(t)) or  U[1,1+cr] 
(when increasing  ti(t)), where ca and cr are global system constants. To smooth over 
noise in the learning system, there is an additional “momentum” parameter gi for each 
trader (such momentum is also commonly used in back-propagation neural networks).  
 
Thus, adaptation in each ZIP trader i has the following parameters: initial margin mi(0); 
learning rate bi; and momentum term gi.  In an entire market populated by ZIP traders, 
values for these three parameters are randomly assigned to each trader via the following 
expressions: mi(0)=U[mmin, mmin+mD]; bi=U[bmin, bmin+bD]; and gi=U[gmin, gmin+gD]. Note 
that any parameter p assigned a value from a uniform distribution p=U[a,a+b] can (if 
necessary) be implicitly assigned as a constant c by setting a=c and b=0, i.e. p=U[c,c]. 
So, defining the assignment of parameter values as  being  from random distributions 
includes the possibility that any or all of the parameters are given fixed/constant values. 
 
Hence, to initialize an entire ZIP-trader market it is necessary to specify values for the six 
market-initialization parameters mmin, mD, bmin, bD, gmin, and gD. Values also need to be 
specified for the two global system constants ca and cr. And so it can be seen that any set 
of initialization parameters for a ZIP-trader market exists within an eight-dimensional 
real space. Vectors in this 8-space can be considered as “genotypes” in a genetic algo-
rithm (GA), and from an initial population of such genotypes it is possible to allow a GA 
to find new genotype vectors that best satisfy an appropriate evaluation function. For the 
purposes of the narrative in this paper, we can consider the GA optimizer as a “black 
box” and leave it largely un-discussed: some details are given in Appendix C of this pa-
per, and full details accompany the source-code in (Cliff, 2005). 
                                                            
7 Here v=U[x,y] denotes a random real value v generated from a uniform distribution over the range [x,y]. D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           12 
 
In the experiments reported here, as before, the passage of time is simulated by dividing 
continuous time (possibly irregularly) into discrete slices, numbered sequentially, where 
one significant event is known to occur in each slice. In each time-slice, the atomic “sig-
nificant event” is one quote being issued by one trader and the other traders then re-
sponding either by ignoring the quote or by one of the traders accepting the quote. (In 
contrast, Das et al. (2001) used a continuous-time formulation of the ZIP algorithm). 
 
In the markets described here (as in Cliff, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2002a-d, 2003, 2005), on 
each time-slice a ZIP trader i is chosen at random from those currently able to quote (i.e. 
those who hold appropriate stock or currency), and trader i’s quote price pi(t) then be-
comes the “current quote” q(t) for time t. Next, all traders j on the contraside (i.e. all buy-
ers j if i is a seller, or all sellers j if i is a buyer) compare q(t) to their own current quote 
price pj(t) and if the quotes cross (i.e. if pj(t)<=q(t) for sellers, or if pj(t)>=q(t) for buy-
ers) then the trader j is able to accept the quote. If more than one trader is able to accept, 
one is chosen at random to make the transaction. If no traders are able to accept, the 
quote is regarded as “ignored”. Once the trade is either accepted or ignored, the traders 
update their mi(t) values using the learning algorithm outlined above, and the current 
time-slice ends. This process repeats for each time-slice in a trading period, with 
occasional injections of fresh currency and stock, or redistribution of li limit prices, until 
either a maximum number of time-slices have run, or a maximum number of sequential 
quotes have been ignored. 
 
Appendix B shows pseudo-code and gives further details of the update equations for the 
ZIP trading algorithm. 
 
 
2.2. A Space of Possible Auctions 
 
Now consider the case where we implement a ZIP-trader continuous double auction 
(CDA) market. In any one time-slice in a CDA either a buyer or a seller may quote, and 
in the definition of a CDA a quote is equally likely from each side.  One way of imple-
menting a CDA is, at the start of each time-slice, to generate an unbiased random binary 
variable to determine whether the next quote will come from a buyer or a seller, and then 
to randomly choose one individual as the quoter from whichever side the binary value 
points to. Here, as in all previous ZIP work, that random binary variable is always inde-
pendently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over all time-slices. 
  
So, let Q=b denote the event that a buyer quotes on any one time-slice and let Q=s de-
note the event that a seller quotes. For the CDA we can then write Pr(Q=s)=0.5. Note 
that because Pr(Q=b)=1.0-Pr(Q=s) it is only necessary to specify Pr(Q=s), which we 
will abbreviate to Qs hereafter. Note additionally that in an English Auction (EA) we 
have Qs=0.0, and in the Dutch Flower Auction (DFA) we have Qs=1.0. Thus, there are at 
least three values of Qs (0.0, 0.5, and 1.0) that correspond to three types of auction famil-
iar from centuries of human economic affairs. The fact that any ZIP trader j will accept a 
quote whenever q(t) and pj(t) cross means that the one-sided extreme cases Qs=0.0 and 
Qs=1.0 are not exact analogues of the EA and DFA. Nevertheless, the methods developed D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           13 
in (Cliff, 2002a) have since been independently replicated and extended to include true 
analogues of the EA and DFA (Qin, 2002; Qin & Kovacs, 2004).  
 
Here, as in (Cliff, 2002a), the Qs values of 0.0, 0.5, and 1.0 are not considered as three 
distinct market mechanisms, but rather as the two endpoints and the midpoint on a con-
tinuum of mechanisms. For values other than these, there is a straightforward implemen-
tation. For example,  Qs=0.1 can be interpreted as specifying an auction mechanism 
where, on the average, for every nine quotes by buyers, there will be one quote from a 
seller, as a result of an exogenously imposed bias. While the history of human economic 
affairs seems to offer no examples of markets in which values of Qs other than 0.0, 0.5, or 
1.0 have been used. Nevertheless, there is no a priori reason to argue that these three pre-
viously-known points on this Qs continuum are the only loci of useful auction types. 
Maybe there are circumstances in which values such as  Qs=0.25 (say) are preferred. 
Given the infinite nature of this real continuum it seems appealing to use an automatic 
exploration process, such as the GA, to identify useful values of Qs.   
 
Thus, in (Cliff, 2002a-d, 2003) a ninth dimension was added to the search space, so the 
genotype in the GA became the eight real values for ZIP-trader initialization, plus a real 
value for Qs. For completeness, note that (as in all the previous GA-ZIP work) in the new 
experiments reported here no “NYSE” quote-improvement or spread-reduction rule was 
used. Such a rule forces buyers to only quote bids higher than the current best bid, and 
sellers to only quote offers lower than the current best offer.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that while the model of the CDA provided here by setting 
Qs=0.5 imposes no exogenous bias on the quoting activity of the traders in the market-
place, it does not address the issue of spontaneous endogenous biases that might arise in a 
real market. A hypothetical example of endogenous biases might be a case where an er-
roneous news story causes a temporary crash in the market price of a security: as the 
price crashes downwards, there may be a simple absence of any bids from buyers for 
some period until the offer-prices quoted by the sellers have dropped far enough (so the 
market acts for a period as if Qs=1.0); but then, once it is clear that the news story was 
wrong, as the market reverts back toward the previous “true” price, there is likely to be 
much more quoting activity from the buyers than from the sellers (so the market may ap-
pear for a period to be acting as if Qs=0.0). As in all the previously-published GA-ZIP 
work, the basic ZIP-trader algorithm used here does not involve spontaneous generation 
of quotes by the traders (rather, any ZIP trader provides a quote when it is randomly se-
lected to do so), so the study of such endogenously-arising biases is not addressed in the 
work reported here..  
 
 
2.3. Previous ZIP8 Results 
 
In (Cliff, 2003), results from 32 sets of ZIP8 experiments were published, where each 
experiment involved one or more of four market supply and demand schedules. These 
four schedules are referred to as markets M1, M2, M3, and M4, and are illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. For consistency  and ease of comparison with those earlier results, all the new 
ZIP60 experiments whose results are tabulated in Section 3 of this paper will use the 
same set of schedules, and much the same experiment methods. D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           14 
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Figure 1: Supply and demand schedules for markets M1 (top left), M2 (top right), M3 
(bottom left) and M4 (bottom right). In all four figures, the horizontal axis is quantity 
(from 0 to 12) and the vertical axis is price (from 0.00 to 4.00). The upward-sloping sup-
ply curve is shown by the solid line, and the downward-sloping demand curve is shown 
by the broken line.   
 
 
In all four schedules there are 11 buyers and 11 sellers, each empowered to buy/sell one 
unit of commodity: these relatively small numbers of traders are the cause of the stepped 
supply and demand curves. So, for example, in Market M1 the Supply curve looks the 
way it does because there is one seller willing to sell one unit at a price of $0.75; there is 
another seller willing to sell one unit at a price of $1.00 (so total supply at price $1.00 is 2 
units); another one unit offered at a price of $1.25 (taking total supply to 3); and so on in 
price-increments of $0.25 up to the final (11
th) unit offered at $3.25. The Demand curve 
is similarly the aggregate result of each trader having a cash endowment to buy one unit 
at a price no greater than that trader’s limit price. Market M1 is taken from Smith’s semi-
nal 1962 paper on  his  early  experimental economics work, and the remaining three 
markets are minor variations on M1. In M2 the slope of the demand curve has been 
greatly reduced while the slope of the supply curve has been increased only slightly; and 
in M4 the slope of the supply curve has been greatly reduced while the slope of the 
demand curve has been increased only slightly. In M3 the slopes of both the supply and 
demand curves are only slightly steeper than the slopes in M1. Despite the apparent 
similarity between M1 and M3, a detailed empirical study presented in (Cliff, 2002c) D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           15 
demonstrated that the minor differences between the supply and demand curves in M1 
and M3 can lead to significant differences in the final best evolved solutions.  
 
The  evolving-mechanism  experiments reported in (Cliff, 2003) studied the effects of 
“shock changes” being inflicted on the market by swapping from one schedule to another 
partway through the evaluation process: a procedure common in human-based 
experimental economics (see Smith (1962)), and something that ZIP8 was demonstrated 
as dealing robustly with in (Cliff, 1997).  The maximum number of shocks occurring 
during any evaluation process in (Cliff, 2003) was two (i.e., switching between three 
schedules).
8 For instance, in one experiment referred to here as M121, the evaluation in-
volved six trading periods (“days”) with supply and demand determined by M1, then a 
sudden change to M2, then six periods/days later a reversion to M1 for a final six periods. 
The other sets of experiments are similarly named M212, M123, M321, and so on; and in 
all of them each of the three market schedules was used for six “days”, so these two-
shock trials all last for a total of 18 days.  
 
As in the previous GA-ZIP work, the evaluation function was a weighted average of 
Smith’s (1962) “a” measure of root mean square deviation of transaction prices from the 
underlying theoretical equilibrium price at the start of the period, measured across the six 
periods for each schedule used. Specifically, in each trading period p the value ap was 
calculated, and the evaluation score was computed as (1/Swp).S(ap.wp) for p=1…18 with 
weights w1=1.75, w2=1.5, w3=1.25, w3<p<7=1.0, wp>6=wp-6 for p>6. 
 
In any one experiment, here involving a population of 30 genotypes over 500 genera-
tions, in each generation the elite (best-scoring) individual is of most interest, and so the 
time-series trajectory of the elite evaluation score for the population is compiled across 
the 500 generations. These results are non-deterministic: different runs of the GA (with 
different seed values for its random number generator) will yield different elite trajecto-
ries. Examining the elite-score trajectories from 50 repetitions of an experiment (varying 
only the random seed between repetitions) often gives multimodal results, and in all ex-
periments we are interested only in the best elite mode (i.e. the mode with lowest scores), 
which could be summarized by the mean and standard deviation (s.d.) of the scores 
within that mode at each generation. However, relying on manual identification of the 
elite mode (as was done in (Cliff, 2003)) is subjective and labor-intensive, and automati-
cally identifying the elite mode via cluster analysis does not entirely eliminate subjectiv-
ity either (Jain, Murty, & Flynn, 1999), so in this paper we instead simply study the re-
sults from the best 10% (i.e., the upper decile) of the 50 repetitions of each experiment. 
 
Experiments where the GA controlled the value of Qs are referred to here as evolving-
mechanism (EM) conditions; and those where the value of Qs was not evolved but instead 
was fixed at the CDA value of Qs=0.5 are referred to here as fixed-mechanism (FM).  
 
The results from 18 dual-shock (triple-schedule) experiments were presented in four 
separate data-tables in (Cliff, 2003), grouped by the nature of the shocks (i.e., the “treat-
ment regime”). Table 3 showed results from experiments where only the demand curve 
undergoes a major change on each shock (i.e.: M121, M212, M232, M323, M123, and 
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M321). Table 4 showed results from experiments where only the supply curve undergoes 
a major change on each shock (i.e.: M141, M414, M434, M343, M143, and M341). In 
Table 5, one of the two shocks involves a major change only to the demand curve while 
the other shock involves a major change only to the supply curve (i.e.: M432, M234, 
M412, and M214); and in Table 6 each shock involved a major change to both the supply 
curve and the demand curve (i.e.: M242 and M424). In this paper, all 18 dual-shock re-
sults are shown together in single graphs, but the results appear in table order, as was just 
listed. For convenience of later discussion, we will refer to these four groupings by the 
abbreviations T3, T4, T5, and T6, i.e. referring to each regime type by the table-numbers 
in (Cliff, 2003). So, to be clear: 
 
•  T3: two successive shock-changes to the Demand. 
•  T4: two successive shock-changes to the Supply. 
•  T5: one shock change to Demand, the other to Supply (in either order). 
•  T6: each shock involves major changes both to Supply and to Demand. 
 
Analysis of the ZIP8 results from all four of these regimes, published in (Cliff, 2003) 
showed that the GA never failed to discover EM genotypes that were at least as good (i.e. 
had elite evaluation scores at least as low) as the corresponding FM genotypes, and in 
several cases the EM result was statistically significantly better (i.e., lower) than the FM 
result, at the 1% confidence level using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (see, e.g., Siegel & 
Castellan, 1988). This happened in one out of the six T3 treatments; in five of the six T4 
treatments; in three of the four T5 treatments; and in one of the two T6 treatments. 
Shortly after the analysis of ZIP8 results in (Cliff, 2003) was published, a paper by Fel-
tovich (2003) exposed serious problems with the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test, 
advocating  the Robust Rank-Order  (RRO)  test  as a replacement  (see also  Feltovich, 
2006). The results of re-testing the significance of the ZIP8 EM/FM data in (Cliff, 2003), 
using RRO at 1% confidence in place of WMW, came out differently: now three of the 
six T3 treatments; and all six of the T4 treatments, showed a significant difference (T5 
and T6 were unchanged). Prima facie, it would appear that the outcome of the RRO tests 
strengthens the results, because a greater number of significant differences are identified. 
Unfortunately, it’s not that simple: for the T3 sequence M121, the RRO test reveals a 
significant difference in the ZIP8 in favour of FM rather than EM (Cliff, 2005).        
 
The histogram in Figure 2 shows the results for GA-optimized ZIP8 in FM and EM 
conditions. The statistics in Figure 2 are calculated from the same data as was originally 
analyzed and tabulated in (Cliff, 2003), but the statistics in Fig 1a are the results of con-
ducting  a more rigorous and careful analysis, the rationale for which is discussed i n 
(Cliff, 2005). In the new analysis, the final score recorded as the outcome of any one 
experiment is now taken as an average of the final  ten elite  evaluation scores 
(specifically, over generations 490 to 500) to smooth over noise in the evaluation process; 
and the summary statistics for each type of experiment are here always calculated from 
the top 10% (i.e., the upper decile) of the 50 repetitions of each type of experiment, 
regardless of how many repetitions converged on solutions with final elite scores in the 
best elite mode. So, the data in Figure 2 show the mean and s.d. of the final-outcome elite 
scores from the best (lowest-scoring) five experiments in each study, and the RRO test is D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           17 
used at the 1% confidence level to detect significant differences between the EM and FM 
results.  
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Figure 2. ZIP8 fitness scores from tests in each of 18 market shock sequences, grouped 
into treatment types T3, T4, T5, and T6. Horizontal axis is evaluation score (a weighted 
average of root mean square deviation of the transaction price from the theoretical equi-
librium price, expressed as a percentage of the equilibrium price); lower scores are bet-
ter. The dark-shaded bars are the evolved-mechanism (EM) data; the light-shaded bars 
are fixed-mechanism ( FM) data from using the CDA model. Error bars indicate the 
range plus and minus one standard deviation of the final results for the best n=5 experi-
ments from i.i.d. 50 repetitions of each experiment. Each experiment’s final result is cal-
culated as the mean elite score over the last ten generations. The suffix “s” or “n” on 
each bar label indicates whether a statistically significant difference is detected (“s”) or 
not (“n”) between the EM and FM results, using the Robust Rank-Order (RRO) test at 
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2.4 Related Work  
 
These previous GA-ZIP results have subsequently been replicated, adapted, and extended 
in a number of independent studies. Robinson (2002) explored the use of evolved market-
mechanisms in the context of market-based control (e.g. Clearwater, 1995) of scarce re-
sources in utility-scale corporate data centers. Walia et al. (Walia 2002; Cliff, Walia, & 
Byde, 2003) explored the use of the same evolving-mechanism techniques but with mar-
kets populated by Gode & Sunder’s (1993) ZI trader-agents rather than ZIP traders, again 
finding evidence that non-standard hybrid mechanisms were discovered as good/best so-
lutions by the GA; and Byde (2003) demonstrated that the same techniques could lead to 
the evolution of hybrid sealed-bid auction mechanisms, regardless of the type of trader 
operating in the market. Shipp (2004) investigated how the nature of the evolved solu-
tions changed as the number of “market shocks” used in the evaluation process increased; 
and Wichett (2004) explored a system in which multiple reproductively separate “gene-
pools” of ZIP traders competed, co-adapted, and co-evolved along with the market 
mechanism. Other recent uses of ZIP include modifying it for bargaining in sealed-bid 
auctions (Bagnall & Toft, 2004); using ZIP traders to study speculative trading in busi-
ness-to-business exchanges (Li & Smith, 2004); and using ZIP traders to explore issues 
of reputation and information quality in a variety of market configurations (Ladley & 
Bullock , 2005)   
 
In addition to the work of Phelps et al. discussed in Section 1.2 (Phelps et al., 2002; 
Phelps, Parsons, & McBurney, 2004; Phelps et al., 2005), which was undertaken at ap-
proximately the same time as the research summarized in Section 2.3, a number of other 
authors have more recently reported on the results of using artificial evolution and other 
forms of automated search, learning, or optimization for exploring spaces of possible 
trader-agent strategies, and possible new auction mechanisms, generally with positive 
results (Tesauro & Bredin, 2002; Gerding, Somefun, & La Poutré, 2004; Lochner & 
Wellman, 2004; Park, Durfee, & Birmingham, 2004; Greenwald et al., 2005; Pardoe & 
Stone, 2005; Reeves et al., 2005; Wellman, et al.,  2005). Of course, the paper introduc-
ing ZIP (Cliff, 1997) was not the first-ever study of artificial trading agents in double-
auction markets; relevant prior work includes that by Wilson (1987), Friedman (1991), 
Easley & Ledyard (1992), Rust, Miller,  Palmer (1992), and Gjerstad & Dickhaut (1998). 
For additional discussion of previous work, see the review in (Cliff, 1997). 
 
In the next Section, the expansion of the number of parameters governing ZIP from 8 up 
to 60 is explained (Section 3.1), and empirical results are presented (Section 3.2) which 
show that ZIP60 performs better than ZIP8, so long as the GA is given control of the 
number of parameters being used by the ZIP algorithm, as described in Section 3.3. The 
results are then analysed and discussed in Section 4.  D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           19 
3. ZIP60 
 
3.1 From 8 to 60 in five paragraphs  
 
Despite the problem with the old M121 results that was revealed by the new analysis in 
the previous section, the results from using a GA to fine-tune the ZIP trader parameters 
remain generally encouraging. In fact, they are sufficiently encouraging to prompt 
speculation that perhaps new variants of ZIP can be developed to take advantage of the 
fact that we can now (generally, at least) rely on automated search a nd optimization 
algorithms such as the GA to set appropriate values for the numeric parameters affecting 
the ZIP market, so there is no need to try to keep the number of such parameters 
sufficiently small to render them easily manageable or comprehensible by a human.  
 
To this end, note that in ZIP8 the genome specifies the same vector of eight real values 
{mmin , mD , bmin , bD , gmin , gD , ca , cr} whether the trader is a buyer or a seller. But in some 
situations it’s perfectly plausible that the overall market dynamics might be better if the 
buyers were using different parameter-values to the sellers, so we could in principle have 
a GA-ZIP system dealing with these two cases (i.e. where Case 1 is that the trader is a 
buyer; Case 2 is that the trader is a seller) and hence optimizing sixteen real parameters 
(i.e., “ZIP16”), where the first eight values are the vector used to initialise the buyers and 
the second eight are the vector used to initialise the sellers. 
 
Furthermore, note also that in some situations a ZIP trader (whether it is a buyer or a 
seller) has to increase its margin, and in others it has to decrease its margin, and that it 
might be useful to have different parameter-values depending on which of the four cases 
we are in, i.e. whether the trader is a buyer raising its margin, a buyer lowering its mar-
gin, a seller raising, or a seller lowering. That would give us four cases, each with eight 
values, or “ZIP32”.  
 
But we can then note that, in the original specification of the ZIP algorithm, both for buy-
ers and for sellers, there are actually three different cases or circumstances in which the 
trader alters its margin (see Cliff, 1997, pp.42-43 for the reasoning behind this design). 
For example, a seller’s margin is raised if one condition holds true (i.e., if the last quote 
was accepted and the seller’s current price is less than the price of the current quote); but 
a seller’s margin is lowered if either of two other possible conditions are true (i.e., if the 
last quote was an accepted bid and the seller is active and the seller’s price is greater than 
the price of the last quote; or if the last quote was an offer that was accepted and the 
seller is active and its price is greater than the price of the last quote). So we could have 
the genome specify three corresponding parameter-value vectors for the buyers and also 
three such vectors for the sellers, i.e. a total of six different vectors for six different cases, 
which at eight values per vector gives us “ZIP48”. 
 
And in a final flourish of parameter-count inflation, let’s abandon the use of a mere pair 
of system-wide global constants ca and cr and in place initialise each trader i with its own 
corresponding “personal” values ca,i and cr,i, generated at initialization from the uniform 
distributions  U[ca:min, c a:min+ca:D] and  U[cr:min, c r:min+cr:D]. This addition of extra pa-
rameters still allows solutions involving the old system-wide constant ca and cr values to 
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with (near-)zero values of ca:D and cr:D. So, each of the six parameter-value vectors needs 
now to specify values not only the six previous system parameters (mmin , mD , bmin , bD , 
gmin , and gD) but also the values for the four newly-introduced system parameters ca:min, 
ca:D, cr:min, and cr:D  -  for six cases, that gives six vectors, each with ten values per vector, 
and hence sixty values for ZIP60. 
 
It is worth noting that this final increase from eight to ten parameter-values per case 
could also be applied to any of the other ZIPn versions mentioned in the preceding para-
graphs. That is, by the expansion of the specification of ca and cr, ZIP8 could be ex-
panded to ZIP10; ZIP16 could be expanded to ZIP20; and ZIP32 could be expanded to 
ZIP40.  
 
The analysis and discussion that come later will be eased if we introduce some terminol-
ogy here. While a ZIP8 trader has one genetically-specified value for each parameter (so, 
for example, it has only one bmin value), a ZIP60 genome specifies six related parameter 
values – one for each case – which we will refer to by adding case-numbers to the sub-
script (e.g.: bmin:1, bmin:2, ..., bmin:6). For ZIP60, the entire set of sixty parameters can be 
generated from the pattern Pt:n where P is one of {m , b , g, ca , cr}; t is one of {min, D}; 
and n is an integer in {1,…,6}. We’ll refer to the set of six values for any one parameter-
type (i.e., {Pt:1, Pt:2, …, Pt:6}) as the homologous set of Pt parameter values. The ZIP60 
interpretation for the six cases in each homologous set are as follows (where q.type indi-
cates whether the last quote in the market was a bid or an offer): 
 
•  Pt:1:  value of Pt  for the case when a Seller raises its margin. 
•  Pt:2:  value of Pt  for the case when a Seller lowers its margin and q.type=Bid. 
•  Pt:3:  value of Pt  for the case when a Seller lowers its margin and q.type=Offer. 
 
•  Pt:4: value of Pt  for the case when a Buyer raises its margin. 
•  Pt:5: value of Pt  for the case when a Buyer lowers its margin and q.type=Bid. 
•  Pt:6: value of Pt  for the case when a Buyer lowers its margin and q.type=Offer. 
 
Finally, note that the additional computational costs of using ZIP60 as a replacement for 
ZIP8 are virtually zero. The space costs are those incurred in storing the additional 52 
real-valued parameters: this is a large percentage increase, but in absolute terms it is still 
a very small amount of storage when expressed as actual additional bytes required. The 
additional time costs are also very low i ndeed: a tiny amount of extra processing is 
needed in initialising the ZIP60 trader (i.e., populating its look-up table of 60 real values) 
and then in doing table look-up while the trader is operating (i.e. choosing the values to 
use that are appropriate to the current “case”), but that’s it. This is (almost) a free lunch.  
 
 
3.2 ZIP60 results  
 
In testing the performance of ZIP60 thus far, all effort has been devoted to exploring the 
performance of ZIP60 on the dual-shock tests: if markets populated by ZIP traders cannot 
cope with sudden shock-changes in supply and demand, then they are of  very  little 
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that if ZIP60 does better than ZIP8 on these multi-shock tests, then it will also do better 
in those cases where there are fewer or no market shocks.  
 
The experience now gained with GA optimisation of ZIP60 indicates that significant care 
is needed in managing the dimensionality of the search-space: simply applying the old 
methods that worked well with ZIP8 does not give best results when working with ZIP60. 
This is a lesson learnt from (partial) failure: for the very first attempts at evolutionary op-
timization of ZIP60 traders, the same experiment methods as described in Section 2 were 
used, except that the initial population was composed entirely of randomly generated 
ZIP60 individuals, rather than ZIP8s. The outcome of those experiments is illustrated in 
Figure 3, and comparison with Figure 2 reveals that the results from this first attempt 
with ZIP60 were somewhat mixed. Although ZIP60 EM scores were never worse than 
ZIP60 FM, and in some cases were significantly better, and while the scores of the elite 
evolved ZIP60 traders were on the overall average significantly better than the elite ZIP8 
scores in the same experiments, the standard deviation on that average improvement was 
almost identical to the mean improvement itself. This very large standard deviation was a 
reflection of the fact that, in three specific cases (M434, M424, & M242), the evolved 
elite ZIP60 results were actually significantly worse than the corresponding ZIP8 results.  
 
Now there is nothing preventing the ZIP60 GA system from evolving genotypes that cor-
respond to ZIP8 solutions, so it seems peculiar that the ZIP60s perform worse than the 
ZIP8s in some cases. There are certainly points within the ZIP60 genome-space that cor-
respond perfectly to ZIP8 solutions: if for each of the ten homologous sets the within-set 
variance of the parameter values for the set is (near) zero, then that ZIP60 genome is 
functionally equivalent to the corresponding single-case ZIP10 genome; and furthermore 
if the values of the ca:D and cr:D homologous sets are all zero, then the ZIP60 is function-
ing as a ZIP8. So, how come the ZIP60 results are sometimes worse than ZIP8? The fact 
that the GA failed even to find the known good ZIP8 solutions within the ZIP60 genome 
space is a strong indication that the 60-dimensional search space has characteristics (such 
as local maxima, sharp ridges, and plateaus in the fitness landscape) which make the 
search for good genomes a nontrivial process. 
 
To address this, the ZIP genetic encoding was extended, allowing the number of cases (1, 
2, 4, or 6, as discussed in Section 3.1) to be specified on the genome itself. The rest of the 
genome is still a set of ten homologous-set vectors (each made of six real numbers). If an 
individual’s gene specifying the number of cases is set to one, then all six parameter-val-
ues are set to be identical within each homologous set, by copying the values from the 
first element of the set into the remaining five. If the number of cases is set to two, then 
the three buyer-case parameter values within each set are forced to be identical copies of 
each other, as are the three seller values; and if the number of cases is set to be six, then 
the three buyer and the three seller parameters can all be different numeric values. Thus, 
the ZIP60 genomes are always 60 parameter-values long, but over-writing duplication of 
values within the genome can reduce the effective dimensionality of the parameter-vec-
tors encoded on a particular genome so that it codes for any of the family of ZIP algo-
rithms between ZIP60 and ZIP8. This is illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 3: ZIP60 fitness data from the first attempt at GA optimization; format as for 
Figure 2.  
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Figure 4: Schematic illustration showing how values are copied across the ZIP60 pa-
rameter vectors (i.e., genomes), which always have a length of 60, in the situations where 
the genetically-specified number of cases is (from top to bottom) 1, 2, 4, and 6 – labelled 
as c1, c2, c4, and c6, respectively. In each figure, the ZIP60 genome is shown as a line of 
60 slots, with tick-marks marking the division into six groups of ten slots, one group for 
each possible case, so that homologous sets of parameters are distributed across the ge-
nome with successive values in each set being ten slots apart.  In the c1 situation (top) the 
first set of ten values is systematically copied into each of the other five groups, so that 
each homologous set has the same value: this is indicated by the arrows showing the first 
value being copied into the six slots for that parameter’s homologous set, and identical 
values are given the same shading-pattern. In the figures for c2, c4, and c6, the number 
of copy operations is reduced and so the number of (potentially) different values within 
one homologous set increases.  
 
 
The motivating hypothesis for placing the dimensionality of the search-space under evo-
lutionary control was the belief that the GA’s evolutionary search would be more suc-
cessful if it could start by first simply optimizing the 1-case genome, and then (only once 
all the values are approximately correct) could successive multi-case refinements be pro-
gressively introduced by the GA as necessary. So, for example, if a 1-case individual 
mutated to become a high-case individual, thereby decoupling its genome-values across 
the different cases, such a mutant would only be retained in the population if the mutation 
that increases the number of cases is also associated with higher fitness. Strictly speaking, 
the initial case-increasing mutation is evolutionarily selectively neutral: the genome val-
c1 
c2 
c4 
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ues for the different cases start out as identical copies of each other, but the case-increas-
ing mutation allows subsequent mutations to introduce differences across cases, and it is 
those mutations that will be retained if they are correlated with higher fitness.  Handing 
evolutionary control of the dimensionality of a search-space to the GA that is searching 
that space is an idea that was first explored in depth in Harvey’s 1994 PhD thesis, where 
he provided detailed arguments for applying such incremental evolution and developed 
the “species adaptation genetic algorithm”, which was first successfully applied in 
evolving neural-network controllers for autonomous mobile physical robots  (Cliff, 
Harvey, & Husbands 1993).
9 
 
Two new sets of ZIP60 experiments were performed to test the effects of GA-controlled 
dimensionality. In the first set, the population was initialised with individuals that had a 
randomly-assigned value for the number of cases on their genome, with the values 1, 2, 4, 
and 6 being equally probable. This is the initialization we refer to here as ZIP60(1:6) (for 
“from 1 case to 6 cases”). In the second set, every individual in the initial population was 
set to have a 1-case genome; this is referred to here as the ZIP60(1:1) initialization.  And 
so the first set of experiments, where all individuals in the initial populations were 6-case 
individuals, are referred to as ZIP60(6:6). Results from the EM experiments with ZIP60 
with the (1:1), (1:6), and (6:6) initializations are shown in Figure 5 ,  expressed as 
percentage changes over the corresponding mean ZIP8 EM scores from Figure 4. 
  
Overall, on average, the ZIP60(1:1) scores are 14.0% better (lower) than the ZIP8 scores 
(and the s.d. on that mean improvement is 5.7%). In comparison, the ZIP60(6:6) scores 
are on average 12.91% better than the ZIP8, but the s.d. on that improvement is 12.88%; 
and for ZIP60(1:6), the average improvement is 12.32% with s.d.=7.03%. So, ZIP60(1:1) 
has the highest mean increase in performance and the lowest s.d. on its mean increase.  
 
Results from significance analysis of the differences between the ZIP60(1:1) and 
ZIP60(1:6) upper-decile elite scores for the 18 dual-shock experiment schedules are 
tabulated in (Cliff, 2005), and they offer weakly supportive evidence for the claim that 
ZIP60(1:1) is a better initialization than ZIP60(1:6). Using the  RRO test at the 1% 
significance level reveals that, over the 18 types of experiment, only for schedule M242 
does ZIP60(1:1) lead to significantly better results than ZIP60(1:6). In all other cases, no 
statistically significant difference in the scores is detected. So, ZIP60(1:1) is certainly no 
worse than ZIP60(1:6), and the evidence thus far is that it is actually significantly better 
in one of the 18 cases studied. Moreover, the ZIP60(1:1) results are the only set of the 
three that improve on ZIP8 in every experiment. From this, we conclude that the (1:1) 
initialization method is to be preferred when using a simple GA to optimize a ZIP60 
market. The absence of a huge difference between (1:1) and (1:6) is perhaps no surprise 
given that a ZIP60(1:1) system will, after sufficiently many generations, be pretty much 
indistinguishable from a ZIP60(1:6) as mutants with case-values greater than unity are 
progressively retained in the (1:1)-seeded population. 
                                                            
9 A recent paper by Stanley & Miikkulainen (2004) re-discovers some of Harvey’s (1994) ideas of 
evolutionarily controlled dimensionality increase and incremental evolution, which Stanley & Miikkulainen 
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Figure 5 :  Results from incremental evolution for the three different methods of 
initializing the ZIP60 population.  Horizontal axis  shows percentage 
improvement/deterioration, calculated as the difference between the ZIP60 and ZIP8 
upper-decile mean elite scores, expressed as a percentage of the ZIP8 score. Positive 
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Figure 6 illustrates the underlying evolutionary dynamics in one set of 50 repetitions of a 
ZIP60(1:1) GA experiment. The four lines on the graph indicates, for each generation, the 
number of experiments in which that generation’s elite individual’s genotype is either 1-
case, 2-case, 4-case, or 6-case (ZIP8, ZIP20, ZIP40, or ZIP60).
10 As can be seen, there is 
an initial rapid fall in the number of 1 -case elite genotypes, as the number of elite 
genotypes that are 4-case and 6-case progressively rises. At approximately generation 
g=50, the number of 4-case elite genotypes levels off and then starts a steady decline 
which lasts until it has decayed to a noise-level at approximately g=300, but the number 
of 6-case genotypes continues to rise, and by g=300 pretty much all (49/50, i.e. 98%) of 
the experiments have an elite individual with a 6-case genotype.  
 
The outcomes of the ZIP60(1:1) experiments that have been presented in this section are 
further analyzed and discussed in the next section. 
                                                            
10 The source-code (Cliff, 2005) allows one-case genomes to be interpreted as either ZIP8 or ZIP10; in all 
the experiments reported in this paper, the interpretation was ZIP8.  D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           27 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Evolutionary dynamics of 50 repetitions (with different random seeds) of the M121 
ZIP60(1:1) experiment. The four data series show, for each generation, the count (vertical axis) 
of the number of experiments in which the elite individual genotype at generation g (horizontal 
axis) has an allele value of 1, 2, 4, or 6 on its locus for the number of cases. Because this is a 
(1:1) initialization, the number of 1-case genotypes is initially 50, and for the three other types 
the number is zero. The number of 4-case and 6-case genotypes rises steadily for the first 50 
generations, but thereafter the number of 4-cases goes into decline while the number of 6-cases 
continues increasing, to saturation at generation 300. The number of 2-case genotypes rises only 
very slightly in the early stages of the experiments (approximately the first 50 generations), and 
then falls back to noise levels.  
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4. Analysis and Discussion 
 
4.1 Analysis 
 
The work reported in this paper is motivated by the belief that increasing the number of 
parameters in the ZIP algorithm improves the algorithm’s performance. We need to be 
sure that no ZIP8 solutions are hidden in the evolved ZIP60 solutions. 
 
That is, the results presented in Section 3 demonstrate that indeed ZIP60 out-performs 
ZIP8, and the fact that the GA typically settles on solution genomes with six cases (i.e., 
ZIP60) rather than four, two, or one (i.e. ZIP40, ZIP20, or ZIP8) indicates that a larger 
number of additional parameters are indeed useful; but (as was noted in Section 3.3) it is 
possible for a ZIP60 genome to be functionally equivalent to a lower-dimensioned ZIPn 
genome. In the most extreme case, if all the values in each homologous set of parameters 
are equal for any one genome (e.g. bmin1=bmin2=bmin3=bmin4=bmin5=bmin6), or if the differ-
ences between them are all sufficiently small to be ignored as mutational noise, then that 
ZIP60 genome is functionally equivalent to a ZIP10 genome (and if it has zero values for 
its caD and crD  parameters, it is effectively a ZIP8). Of course, different homologous sets 
in the genome might have different values, but if for each homologous set the values 
within the set have (near-)zero variance then that ZIP60 genome is effectively a ZIP10. 
Different genomes may have different values at a particular locus, or in different ho-
mologous sets, but if all the genomes have the property that within each individual’s ge-
nome the variance of the values in each homologous set is near-zero, then all those ge-
nomes are ZIP10. 
 
So, to confirm that ZIP60 is indeed an advance on ZIP10 (or ZIP8), some analysis of the 
final evolved parameter-sets is necessary, to see whether they contain any low-dimen-
sional solutions embedded in higher-dimensional spaces. To this end, principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA)
11 was used on the parameter-values from the top-decile ZIP60(1:1) 
genomes (i.e. the genomes whose performance was summarised in Table 7). Specifically, 
each six-dimensional homologous set of final evolved parameter values was individually 
subjected to PCA, and the percentage of the variance in the parameter values accounted 
for by each principal component (PC) was calculated. If all the values in any one ho-
mologous set were equal or approximately equal, the first PC would account for close to 
100% of the variance. However, the first PC would also account for close to 100% of the 
variance if the values in the homologous set were positioned along/around any line in the 
6-D space, e.g. one where Pt:i?Pt:j  (for some P in {m , b , g, ca , cr}; some t in {min, D}; 
and for i, j integers in {1,…,6} with i?j). So, to identify a ZIP10 embedded in a ZIP60 
genome, we’d need to see the first PC for each homologous set accounting for close to 
100% of the variance,  and  see  the angle  q  between the first PC and the line 
Pt:1=Pt:2=…=Pt:6 being very close to zero. That is, 
 
q =p - | cos
-1((p.u) / | p |) -p  |                                (Equation 1) 
 
with p being the first PC (a 6-D vector) and u being a 6-D unit vector with elements 
ui:i=1…6  such that u1=u2=…=u6>0.  
                                                            
11 PCA is explained in most textbooks on multivariate analysis: see, e.g., Chatfield & Collins (1980). D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           29 
Figure 7 shows the results of the PCA analysis on the entire data-set of top-decile elite 
genomes, represented in a graphical format (the numeric data is tabulated in Appendix 
A). The first thing to note is that, although PC1 accounts for more than 50% of the vari-
ance in all homologous sets, the highest value is 90% for the PC1 of the bmin set, which is 
not high enough to cause any alarm. Additionally, the angle q is safely high in all cases: 
see Appendix A.  
 
Figure 7 : Stacked-column histogram illustrating the PCA  cumulative Percentage of 
Variance  (PoV)  explained by the six principal  components PC1-PC6 for each 
homologous set of six variables, as defined in the text, for all 90 (=18*5) top-decile elite 
genomes from the ZIP60(1:1) experiments reported in Section 3; For each column, the 
lowest (and lightest-shaded) area represents the variance accounted for by the first PC; 
each successive darker-shaded area above that represents the variance accounted for by 
the next successive PC. The columns show, from left to right, the PCA data for bmin 
(labelled ‘bM’), bD (‘bD’),gmin (‘gM’), gD (‘gD’), mmin (‘mM’), mD (‘mD’), ca:min (‘caM’), 
ca:D (‘caD’), cr:min (‘crM’), and cr:D (‘crD’).  
 
 
The second notable point in these data is that, for all homologous sets, PC6 makes no 
contribution to explaining the variance in the data, and typically the first four PCs 
account for over 95% of the variation. This indicates that the elite genomes occupy a 5-D 
subspace within the 6-D homologous set; and it’s tempting to speculate that perhaps the 
only deviation from the 4-D subspace defined by PC1-PC4 in each case is mere noise. 
This is a point that will be returned to in the discussion of Section 4.2. 
 
Although the data shown Figure 7 are encouraging, this is a rather coarse analysis be-
cause it considers all the ZIP60(1:1) elite genomes together, regardless of the treatment 
regime (i.e. what type of market shocks were applied). In Section 2.4, the four treatment 
regimes in (Cliff, 2003) were given the labels T3, T4, T5, and T6. The four histograms in 
Figure 8 illustrate the results of PCA on the values of the homologous sets of the top-dec-
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ile elite genomes for each of these regimes treated separately (the numeric data is given 
in Appendix A).  
 
The data shown in Figure 8 for T3, T4, and T5 experiments are all broadly similar to that 
in Figure 7: i.e., in all homologous sets the values of q are high and the first four PCs are 
needed to account for close to 100% of the variance. But the T6 data are very different: 
for T6, in the first six homologous sets (determining bmin  ,  bD  ,  gmin  ,  gD  ,  mmin  , and  mD),  
the first PC alone accounts for over 98% of the variance, and the values of q (tabulated in 
Appendix A) are all very low: for these six homologous sets the T6 mean q  is 1.05° 
(s.d.=0.52°) whereas for T3, T4, and T5 the mean q values are 16.32°, 17.15°, and 15.40° 
respectively (s.d.’s 6.37°, 7.00°, & 6.53°). This indicates that, for T6, the data-points in 
each of these homologous sets lie on lines in 6-D space very close to u. Yet the PCs and 
q values for the last four T6 homologous sets (those affecting ca and cr) are much the 
same as those for T3, T5, and T5. 
 
 
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
bM bD gM gD mM mD caM caD crM crD
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
bM bD gM gD mM mD caM caD crM crD
 
 
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
bM bD gM gD mM mD caM caD crM crD
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
bM bD gM gD mM mD caM caD crM crD
 
 
Figure 8: Stacked-column histograms for the PCA PoV data from separate analysis of 
the T3, T4, T5, and T6 experiments (graphs at top left, top right, lower left, & lower 
right, respectively). Format as in Figure 7. D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           31 
 
 
To illustrate these points, Figure 9 shows the values of bmin from the final elite best-mode 
genomes evolved under the T6 treatments plotted as points in the 2D space defined by 
taking the first two principal components (PC1 & PC2) of that set as basis vectors. For 
comparison, we can project the same points onto a 2-D space defined relative to the vec-
tor u from Equation 1, so that each 6-D point p in the homologous set is projected to a 2-
D point (xu , y u). To do this, let u denote the 6-D unit direction vector collinear with 
[1,1,1,1,1,1]
T. Then let xu=p.u (i.e. the perpendicular projection of p onto u: that is, how 
far p comes along the line u) and let yu=|p – xuu| (i.e. the perpendicular distance of the 
point p from the line u). Projecting the 6-D bmin points onto this (xu, yu) space results in 
an arrangement of points that differs from Figure 9 only by two reflections: the data can 
be shown in an almost identical arrangement to that of Figure 9 by projecting each 6-D 
point to (–xu , –yu), as shown in Figure 10. 
 
Projecting each of the first six T6 homologous sets onto (xu , yu)-space gives a set of plots,  
all of which are qualitatively similar to Figure 10, as would be expected. This is a strong 
indication that, for the T6 experiments, we could potentially determine the 36 parameter-
values in the first six homologous sets by specifying just one value for each set, and then 
for each set copying the value so that all parameters within the set hold the same value. 
So for the first six homologous sets in a ZIP60 genome tailored to T6 experiments, we’d 
only have to specify six independent values, and the remaining 30 parameter-values 
would be dependent on those six. And so we can reduce the (6*6=)36-D sub-space within 
ZIP60’s 60-D space to a 6-D space of independent variables. But that still leaves the 24 
values for the remaining four T6 homologous sets (i.e., those affecting ca and cr) to be 
determined. Intriguingly, it appears that there are additional regularities and dependencies 
in the elite evolved values for those sets that can be further exploited to reduce the num-
ber of independent variables that need to be specified.  
 
As mentioned in Section 1, it is beyond the scope of this paper to conduct a full analysis 
and dimension-reduction of the evolved ZIP60 genotypes, but a sketchy proof-of-concept 
for the T6 genotypes can be further advanced here by examining Figures 11 and 12, 
which show 6-D homologous-set values for ca:min plotted in 2-D (xu, yu) space. Figure 11 
shows the ten points from the T6 homologous set for ca:min which is analogous to the plot 
in Figure 10. It is clear in Figure 11 that the data points are not spread out on a flat line, 
but rather seem to be arranged along a diagonal line. Additional evidence for that 
interpretation comes in Figure 12, which shows the entire set of ca:min homologous sets 
(for all 18 market-shock regimes studied here) projected onto the same space: it is clear 
that there is a strong regularity in the elite evolved values for the ca:min parameter, and the 
best-fit straight line is very close to yu=xu (with a high r
2). Qualitatively very similar plots 
result from similar projections onto (xu, yu)-space of the ca:D, cr:min, and cr:D elite evolved 
values as well. The regularities uncovered in these (xu, y u) plots, plus the PCA data, 
indicate that for each of the four homologous sets affecting ca and cr  the evolved elite 
values lie on the lateral surface of a hypercone embedded in the 6 -D space of that 
homologous set. Furthermore, the PCA data indicate that typically over 95% of the 
variance in the four ca and cr homologous sets can be explained by the first three principal 
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these parameters lies on the curved surface of a conventional 3D cone, appropriately 
positioned and oriented in the 6-space of each homologous set and with an appropriate 
vertex angle. If that is the case, it should be possible to derive a small set of independent 
variables from which the values for the 24 parameters in the ca and cr homologous sets 
can be determined. Further such analysis and dimensionality-reduction is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but can be addressed in future publications. The analysis presented 
here is sufficient to demonstrate that the pursuit of such lower-dimensional sets of 
independent variables is likely to be fruitful.  D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           33 
 
 
Figure 9: Each 6-D point in the homologous set for the ten bmin values from the best 
elite-mode genotypes in the ZIP60(1:1) experiments with T6 market-shock regimes, pro-
jected onto the 2-D space defined by taking the first two principal components of that 
homologous set as basis vectors.  
 
 
Figure 10: The same set of 6-D points as in Figure 9, projected onto the 2-D (–xu , –yu) 
space defined from the vector u in Equation 1; details of the projection are given in the 
text.  Similarity with the projection in Figure 9 is obvious (and expected). D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           34 
 
Figure 11: Projection of the 6-D homologous set for the ten ca:min values from the top-
decile best elite-mode genotypes in the ZIP60(1:1) T6 experiments onto the 2-D (xu, yu) 
space, as defined in the text. Although the axes in this plot are log-log, the data are ap-
proximately linear, and fit the line yu=0.8552xu+0.0014 with r
2=0.7647. 
 
 
Figure 12: Projection onto 2-D (xu, yu) space of the homologous set for the ninety ca:min 
values from the best elite-mode genotypes in the ZIP60(1:1) experiments from all 18 mar-
ket-shock regimes. As with Figure 11, the data are approximately linear, and fit the line 
yu=1.0097xu+0.0035 with r
2=0.8926. D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           35 
4.2 Discussion and Further Work 
 
Comparing the ZIP8 and ZIP60 results presented here reveals that with ZIP60 the GA 
much less frequently discovers hybrid values of Qs yielding overall market dynamics that 
are better than those of the corresponding fixed-market CDA Qs=0.5 experiments. That 
is, despite the final ZIP60 EM evolved Qs values varying quite widely, few of them give 
results significantly better than the corresponding FM results. Data tables available in 
(Cliff, 2005) show that in two thirds (12 out of 18) of the original ZIP8 experiments, the 
EM experiment found a “hybrid” Qs value that improved on the corresponding FM score; 
yet in comparable results from the ZIP60(6:6) experiments, the occurrence of superior 
EM results has fallen by 67%, i.e. from 12/18 down to 4/18 (similar falls occur with the 
(1:6) and (1:1) initialisations of the ZIP60 experiments). It seems likely that this is an 
indication that the previously-published results showing evolved hybrid auction 
mechanisms are to some extent artefacts of the lack of sophistication in the ZIP8 traders 
that were used in those studies. A counterpoint to this is that Byde (2003) presented 
results from applying similar GA-search for designs for hybrid sealed-bid auctions, where 
the GA found hybrid solutions to be preferable to the traditional first-price and second-
price sealed bid auctions, and those results were independent of the sophistication of the 
traders in the market. So, the jury’s out but there’s some reasonable doubt, and this is an 
issue that should be explored in more depth in future research. 
 
Figure 6 showed an illustrative evolutionary time-series for the frequency of each of the 
four possible case-types, over 50 repetitions of the same experiment. A notable feature in 
this graph is that the number of 2-case (ZIP20) genomes never rises very far. Although it 
is perhaps no surprise that the final elite genomes almost always encode for six-case 
ZIP60 solutions, the trajectories on this graph may indicate that the initial division into 
two cases, one for buyer-agents and one for seller-agents (a division made on the basis of 
intuition rather than any particular line of reasoning) confers no extra fitness of practical 
use – this extension of ZIP is pretty-much ignored by the GA, which jumps straight to the 
four-case and six-case extensions. This could be read as a clue that the narrative in 
Section 3.1, which is closely followed in the implementation of the genetic encoding (see 
the source-code in (Cliff, 2005)) may not be the best way of expanding from ZIP8 to 
ZIP16 (or from ZIP10 to ZIP20). The narrative in Section 3.1 could just as easily have 
been structured differently by making the first division into two cases be the one that 
distinguishes between situations in which margins are increased and situations in which 
margins are decreased; and then making the  second division into four cases, thereby 
marking the additional distinction between buyers and sellers. That is to say, ZIP8 (and 
ZIP10) could just as easily be redefined to treat buyers and sellers equally, but to have 
different responses depending on in whether the margin is being adjusted up or down. In 
hindsight, a more sophisticated genetic encoding would allow each of the three case 
distinctions (buyer-vs.-seller; raise-vs.-lower; binary-vs.-ternary) to be varied inde-
pendently. Working with that more sophisticated encoding might reveal new variants of 
ZIP with fewer than 60 parameters which nevertheless give results comparable to the 
ZIP60 results presented here.  
 
Reducing the number of parameters without loss of performance with respect to ZIP60 is 
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the proof-of-concept dissection of the T6 elite genomes in Section 4.1. While this demon-
strated the potential viability and usefulness of such dimensionality-reduction, it would 
be more attractive if an automated procedure could be developed. Such a procedure 
should take a collection of ZIP60 genomes and reduce the 60-D space to a smaller v-di-
mensional space of independent parameters, with the remaining (60–v)-dimensional set 
of  dependent parameters having their values assigned automatically from appropriate 
functions of subsets of the independent parameters. There is a large and diverse literature 
covering techniques that could be brought to bear on this problem. One thing that the 
analysis in Section 4.1 makes clear is that simple linear techniques such as PCA are lim-
ited in their applicability, and so nonlinear alternatives to PCA are very likely to be 
needed: see (Hsieh, 2004) for a recent concise review of such nonlinear PCA approaches, 
and alternative techniques. In the same vein, mere analysis of correlations or variance 
between genome values and fitnesses within any one generation and also between succes-
sive generations is also something of a blunt tool: such evolutionary time-series probably 
do contain illuminating data, i.e. “signals” for interdependencies between parameters, but 
teasing those signals out from the mutational and behavioural “noise” may require more 
sophisticated approaches, such as analysis of cointegration and Granger causality, that are 
common in real-world financial data analysis (see, e.g., Alexander, 2001) but have not 
yet seen any serious use in studies of artificial trader agents.  
 
Future papers can report on results from research into automatically setting and/or adjust-
ing the sixty parameters in ZIP60 by exploiting dependencies between those parameters, 
and (eventually) on doing so without reliance on an offline/batch-mode optimizer such as 
the genetic algorithm used here. While operating in the 60-d space is no problem for an 
offline optimizer such as the GA, for online-real-time adaptation, operating in a space 
with fewer dimensions is likely to be much more efficient, because many algorithms for 
online and real-time adaptation and leaning scale poorly as the number of dimensions 
increases. 
 
Finally, in all the experiments reported here, the GA used was the same simple (and inef-
ficient) plain-vanilla GA first used in (Cliff, 1998) and also used for the experiments re-
ported in all the other GA-ZIP papers (Cliff 2002a-d, 2003). The primary reason for using 
the same simple GA throughout this sequence of experiments was the desire to be able to 
easily compare results across the different styles of experiment reported on in that se-
quence of papers. But this strand of work has now matured to the point where the sim-
plicity and inefficiency of the GA is a manifest weakness in the overall method. All that 
has been reported and analyzed in this paper is the final results of using the GA as a 
search and optimization process, and there are certainly several other automatic search 
and optimization techniques that could generate the same results quicker. Two grounds 
on which the GA implementation (Cliff, 2005) could be criticised are: the naïve way in 
which it deals with stochastic noise in the evaluation process; and the large amounts of 
information it throws away. The evaluation process deals with noise by simply taking an 
average over a large number of trials, but better methods have been known for a long 
time (e.g. Aizawa & Wah, 1994; Stroud, 2001). For simple GAs such as the one used 
here, a lot of information is thrown away when each generation is replaced by its succes-
sor (i.e. the immediate descendent population). The search is likely to be much more effi-
cient if some type of Estimation of Distribution Algorithm (EDA) was used instead. In an D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           37 
EDA, some or all of the genomes generated in the course of the GA are stored and ana-
lyzed, and the result of that analysis then influences or biases the subsequent generation 
of new genomes (Michalski, 2000; Larrañaga & Lozano, 2001; Zhang et al. 2004; Sun et 
al. 2005). 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
From the new data summarized and analyzed in this paper, it is clear that the ZIP60 vari-
ant of ZIP is a genuine improvement on the original ZIP8, and that ZIP60 parameter-
vectors that outperform ZIP8 can be found by a simple GA so long as some care is taken 
in the application of that GA. Specifically, the care required is that the initial population 
be seeded with low-dimensional ZIP8s (or ZIP10s), and that expansion of the dimension-
ality of the search-space is allowed by the GA only when that expansion leads to in-
creases in the fitness of the individuals concerned. Principal component analysis of the 
elite evolved parameter-sets from multiple runs under differently-changing supply and 
demand schedules revealed that the evolved parameter-vectors use considerably more 
values than the eight available in ZIP8, but also indicates that perhaps the best sets of pa-
rameter values reside in lower-dimensional subspaces within the 60-dimensional ZIP60 
parameter space. Thus, it is possible that further analysis of elite evolved ZIP60 parame-
ter-sets will reveal correlations and systematic dependencies, so that the full set of 60 pa-
rameter-values can be generated merely by specifying the values of an appreciably 
smaller number of independent parameters, from which the values of the remaining (de-
pendent) parameters can then be set. Searching for such a subset of independent variables 
is likely to require nonlinear multivariate analysis techniques; and if such an independent 
sub-set can be identified then the next problem to be solved is finding a way to adjust 
those independent parameter-values “on the fly” as the market supply and demand alter 
dynamically, rather than relying on a “batch-mode” optimizer such as the GA used here. 
Finally, the fact that (in comparison to previous experiments using ZIP8 traders) the ex-
periments with ZIP60 traders reported here show a reduced incidence of the discovery of 
“hybrid” auction mechanisms is possibly an indication that the hybrid auctions evolve as 
a consequence of a lack of sophistication in the behavior of ZIP8 traders: with the com-
paratively finer-grained responses of ZIP60 traders, hybrid mechanisms evolve much less 
frequently, and so it is tempting to conjecture that if the same type of auction-design ex-
periments were repeated with even more sophisticated trader agents, hybrid mechanisms 
would not occur at all. Exploring that question remains one of several topics for further 
research.  
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Appendix A: PCA Data Tables 
 
Tables A.1 to A.5 tabulate the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) data that is summa-
rized graphically in Figures 7 and 8, and they additionally show values for the angle q.  
 
 
All  PC1  PC1&2  PC1-3  PC1-4  PC1-5  PC1-6  q 
bmin  90.29  93.59  95.90  97.78  100.00  100.00  13.6 
bD  60.74  75.89  86.51  93.69  100.00  100.00  8.2 
gmin  61.58  76.70  86.42  92.58  100.00  100.00  15.1 
gD  75.84  84.51  90.86  95.09  100.00  100.00  5.2 
mmin  74.92  86.91  92.81  96.36  100.00  100.00  11.4 
mD  67.42  78.48  87.04  94.32  100.00  100.00  15.6 
ca:min  63.30  82.41  90.53  96.05  100.00  100.00  44.2 
ca:D  63.54  76.80  87.60  95.31  100.00  100.00  28.9 
cr:min  58.27  88.33  93.74  98.03  100.00  100.00  49.5 
cr:D  67.41  82.99  92.26  96.61  100.00  100.00  49.5 
 
Table A 1: Cumulative percentage of variance (PoV) explained by the six principal 
components PC1-PC6 for each homologous set of six variables, as defined in the text, for 
all 90 (=18*5) top-decile elite genomes from the experiments reported in Section 3; 
right-most column shows the angle q (expressed in degrees), also defined in the text. This 
is the data illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
 
T3  PC1  PC1&2  PC1-3  PC1-4  PC1-5  PC1-6  q 
bmin  87.63  92.54  96.63  98.25  100.00  100.00  15.9 
bD  55.31  71.25  81.89  90.04  100.00  100.00  11.4 
gmin  59.55  73.63  84.62  92.73  100.00  100.00  15.4 
gD  73.42  86.04  91.29  94.85  100.00  100.00  8.4 
mmin  75.27  86.49  93.04  97.18  100.00  100.00  20.7 
mD  67.99  79.60  87.99  95.19  100.00  100.00  26.1 
ca:min  55.54  88.47  94.72  98.03  100.00  100.00  53.7 
ca:D  54.50  77.85  91.81  97.14  100.00  100.00  25.4 
cr:min  81.58  94.09  97.18  98.85  100.00  100.00  57.1 
cr:D  48.28  73.85  86.67  94.27  100.00  100.00  33.8 
 
Table A2: Cumulative PoV explained by each PC, for the 30 top-decile elite genomes 
from the ZIP60(1:1) T3 experiments reported in Section 3 and illustrated in Figure 8. D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           39 
 
T4  PC1  PC1&2  PC1-3  PC1-4  PC1-5  PC1-6  q 
bmin  77.07  88.57  93.89  97.25  100.00  100.00  23.7 
bD  70.44  84.16  91.93  96.48  100.00  100.00  11.8 
gmin  64.88  84.18  92.49  95.87  100.00  100.00  27.0 
gD  74.12  85.31  92.28  95.60  100.00  100.00  9.8 
mmin  74.62  86.46  93.18  96.98  100.00  100.00  18.1 
mD  68.68  81.49  90.26  95.00  100.00  100.00  12.5 
ca:min  81.88  91.40  96.01  98.74  100.00  100.00  53.2 
ca:D  67.44  86.58  92.08  96.34  100.00  100.00  42.6 
cr:min  71.26  86.17  97.06  99.02  100.00  100.00  54.8 
cr:D  79.89  95.18  97.58  99.17  100.00  100.00  56.0 
 
Table A3: Cumulative PoV explained by each PC, for the 30 top-decile elite genomes 
from the ZIP60(1:1) T4 experiments reported in Section 3 and illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
 
T5  PC1  PC1&2  PC1-3  PC1-4  PC1-5  PC1-6  q 
bmin  89.98  95.73  98.00  99.28  100.00  100.00  16.1 
bD  41.88  71.18  89.28  97.50  100.00  100.00  24.1 
gmin  64.60  81.76  90.59  95.46  100.00  100.00  14.5 
gD  78.45  90.13  95.54  97.77  100.00  100.00  7.7 
mmin  76.46  92.29  95.66  97.78  100.00  100.00  8.8 
mD  66.41  79.84  90.46  96.24  100.00  100.00  21.2 
ca:min  57.63  79.47  90.23  96.95  100.00  100.00  32.7 
ca:D  73.21  83.17  90.83  96.84  100.00  100.00  32.3 
cr:min  68.67  90.45  94.66  98.13  100.00  100.00  53.0 
cr:D  58.59  81.17  92.95  97.91  100.00  100.00  42.0 
 
Table A4: Cumulative PoV explained by each PC, for the 20 top-decile elite genomes 
from the ZIP60(1:1) T5 experiments reported in Section 3 and illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
 
T6  PC1  PC1&2  PC1-3  PC1-4  PC1-5  PC1-6  q 
bmin  98.23  99.47  99.74  99.95  100.00  100.00  1.0 
bD  98.91  99.62  99.81  99.91  100.00  100.00  0.8 
gmin  99.36  99.83  99.93  99.97  100.00  100.00  2.1 
gD  99.60  99.94  99.97  99.99  100.00  100.00  0.7 
mmin  99.88  99.96  99.99  100.00  100.00  100.00  0.8 
mD  99.61  99.86  99.93  99.98  100.00  100.00  0.9 
ca:min  66.69  87.86  97.26  99.68  100.00  100.00  52.7 
ca:D  59.00  80.49  91.80  96.22  100.00  100.00  50.0 
cr:min  84.43  95.71  98.72  99.60  100.00  100.00  64.3 
cr:D  69.31  89.78  95.59  98.44  100.00  100.00  64.9 
 
Table A5: Cumulative PoV explained by each PC, for the 10 top-decile elite genomes 
from the ZIP60(1:1) T6 experiments (where each market shock involves changes in both 
supply and demand) reported in Section 3 and illustrated in Figure 8. D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           40 
Appendix B: Details of the ZIP Algorithm 
 
At the core of the ZIP algorithm is a minimally simplistic set of qualitative heuristics for 
adjusting trader i’s margin m depending on i’s current quote-price p; on whether i is still 
active in the market (i.e., still attempting to trade); and on whether the last quote in the 
marketplace  q was an  offer or a  bid, and whether it was  accepted or not.  These are 
heuristics in the informal sense of the word: they are just some simple rules of thumb 
arrived at by introspection followed by some trial-and-error refinement,  which have 
nevertheless been found to work extraordinarily well in practice. The heuristics for any 
one trader can be thought of as defining a simple decision tree with terminal nodes that 
specify whether the trader should raise or lower its margin, or default to leaving it 
unchanged. For the cases where a change in the margin is required, a set of quantitative 
steps for adjusting the trader’s margin parameter is specified.  Section B.1 shows pseudo-
code for the heuristics; Section B.2  presents  the equations that determine  how the 
quantitative adjustments are made.  
 
 
B.1 Qualitative Margin Heuristics 
 
For SELLERS: 
–  if (q.accepted == true) then 
•  forall sellers si  
–  if si.p = q.price then raise(si.m)  
•  if (q.type == “bid”) then 
–  forall active sellers si  
–  if si.p = q.price 
–  then lower(si.m) 
–  else 
•  if (q.type == offer) then 
–  forall active sellers si  
–  if si.p = q.price 
–  then lower(si.m) 
 
For BUYERS: 
–  if (q.accepted == true) then 
•  forall buyers bi  
–  if bi.p = q.price then raise(bi.m)  
•  if (q.type ==“offer”) then 
–  forall active buyers bi  
–  if bi.p = q.price 
–  then lower(bi.m) 
–  else 
•  if (q.type == bid) then 
–  forall active sellers bi  
–  if bi.p = q.price 
–  then lower(bi.m) D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           41 
B.2 Quantitative Margin Adjustments 
 
The current quote-price at time t for trader i, denoted by pi(t), is set by a function of i’s 
limit price li, and it’s current margin mi(t):  
 
pi(t) = li · ( 1+ mi(t) ) 
 
For sellers, mi(t)˛[0,8] "t; to raise a seller’s margin, the value of mi(t) is increased; and 
to lower the margin it is decreased. For buyers, mi(t)˛[-1,0] "t; and raising a buyer’s 
margin increases the (negative) magnitude of mi(t), taking it closer to -1.0,  whereas 
lowering the margin reduces the magnitude, taking it toward zero. 
 
ZIP uses the discrete-time Widrow-Hoff “delta” learning rule to adjust actual output A 
with respect to some desired output D, which is asymptotically approached at a rate 
determined by the “learning rate” parameter b: 
 
A(t+1) = A(t) + D(t); 
D(t) = b · (D(t) - A(t)). 
 
Which is modified to accommodate a momentum (damping) factor g˛[0,1] as follows:   
 
A(t+1) = g  · A(t) + ( (1–g) · D(t) ). 
 
For ZIP, the A(.) updated by the Delta Rule is the profit margin m:    
 
mi(t+1) = ( pi(t) + Di(t) ) / li – 1 
 
And the D is defined relative to a desired “target price” t, as follows: 
 
Di (t) = bi · (tI (t) – pi(t)) 
ti (t) = (Ai(t) + Ri(t) · q(t)) 
 
Where q(t) is the price of the last quote in the marketplace, and A(.) & R(.) are stochastic 
Absolute and Relative perturbation functions, involving uniform distributions bounded by 
the constants ca and cr respectively, as were introduced in Section 2.1. 
 
Combining all of the above thereby gives: 
 
 mi (t +1) = ( pi(t) + Gi (t) ) / li –1; 
 
 where Gi(0)=0,  
 and Gi (t +1) = g i · Gi (t) + ( (1–g i ) · Di(t) ).  
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Appendix C. The Genetic Algorithm 
 
The simple GA used in (Cliff, 1998, 2001, 2002a-d, 2003) was again used here.  In-
troductory texts on GAs include the good books by Goldberg (1989) and Mitchell (1998). 
In any one experiment, a population of size 30 was evolved for 500 generations: these 
GA parameter values were chosen on the basis of p ast experience.  This choice of 
parameter values is uncontroversial, and the type of GA used here would be expected to 
give roughly the same results with different values of these two parameters, so long as the 
product of the two values is held roughly constant (i.e., so long as the total number of 
genomes evaluated is around 15000), and so long as the two values are roughly within an 
order of magnitude of each other. Each experiment was repeated 50 times with a different 
random seed on each repetition; it was commonly the case that the results from the 50 
repetitions were multi-modally distributed. 
 
In each generation, all individuals were evaluated and assigned a fitness value, and the 
next generation’s population was then generated via mutation and crossover on parents 
identified using rank-based tournament selection. Elitism (where, on each generation, an 
unadulterated version of the fittest individual from the evaluated population is copied into 
the new successor population) was also used.   
 
The genome of each individual was simply a vector of real values for its ZIP parameters, 
plus an additional locus for the real-valued Qs parameter, and latterly an additional locus 
(called n_cases) where the genome specifies the number of cases that it encodes. In each 
experiment, the initial random population was created by generating random real values 
from  U[0,1] for each locus on each individual’s genotype, except n_cases which is 
assigned an integer value of 1, 6, or randomly from {1,…,6} depending on the 
experiment. Crossover points were between the  numeric values, and crossover was 
governed by a Poisson random process with an average of between one and two crosses 
per reproduction event. Mutation  on the real-value loci  was i mplemented by adding 
random values from U[-m(g),+m(g)] where m(g) is the mutation limit at generation g 
(starting the count at g=0). Mutation was applied to each real locus in each genotype on 
each individual generated from a reproduction event, but the mutation limit m(g) was 
gradually reduced via an exponential-decay annealing  function of the form: 
log10(m(g))=log10(ms)-((g/(999)).log10(ms/me)), as was used in the GA of (Cliff, 1998, 
2001, 2002a); where ms is the “start” mutation limit (i.e., for m(0)); and me is the “end” 
mutation limit. In all the experiments reported here, as in all the previous GA-ZIP work, 
ms=0.05 and me=0.0005. The mutation operator applied on n_cases was implemented by 
equi-probably choosing an integer from {1,…,6}.   
   
If ever mutation caused the value at a locus to fall outside the range [0.0,1.0] it was sim-
ply clipped to stay within that range. This clip-to-fit approach to dealing with out-of-
range mutations has been shown (Bullock, 1999) to bias evolution toward extreme values 
(i.e. the upper and lower bounds of the clipping), and so Qs values of 0.0 or 1.0 are, if 
anything, more likely than values within those bounds. Moreover, initial and mutated ge-
nome values of mD, bD, and gD were clipped where necessary to satisfy the constraints 
(mmin+mD)<=1.0, (bmin+bD)<=1.0, and (gmin+gD)<=1.0. 
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The fitness of genotypes was evaluated using the methods described previously in (Cliff, 
1998, 2001, 2002a-d, 2003). One trial of a particular genome was performed by initial-
izing a ZIP-trader market from the genome, and then allowing the ZIP traders to operate 
within the market for a fixed number of trading periods (often colloquially referred to as 
“days”), with allocations of stock and currency being replenished between each trading 
period. During each trading period, Smith’s (1962) a measure (root mean square devia-
tion of transaction prices from the theoretical market equilibrium price) was monitored, 
and a weighted average of a was calculated across the days in the trial, using the method 
described in more detail in the body of this article. As the outcome of any one such trial 
is influenced by stochasticity in the system, the final fitness value for an individual was 
calculated as the arithmetic mean of 100 such trials. So, because any one parameter 
vector specifies a set of distributions and is evaluated over 100 i.i.d. draws from that set 
of distributions, hence the evaluation is over the set of possible instantiations for ZIP60 
traders defined by that set of distributions, rather than any one particular instantiation. 
Note also that as minimal deviation of transaction prices from the theoretical equilibrium 
price is desirable,  so  lower scores are better. That is, we aim here to  minimize the 
evaluation scores: individuals with lower scores will on average have greater 
reproductive fitness (i.e., more offspring).  D. Cliff: ZIP60: Further Explorations in Evolutionary Design of Traders and Market Mechanisms           44 
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